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In theory, the budget process provides multiple
opportunities to articulate claims and ration resources in a
methodical and rational manner. ' However, the American
federal budget process of the 1980' s was, in reality, far
different from the procedural tranquility theory might
suggest. Presidential budgets were pronounced "dead on
arrival" in Congress. Congress itself was politically divided
for the first time in 50 years. As the result of the 1980
election, the House of Representatives was controlled by the
Democrats and the Republican Party had control of the Senate.
[Ref. 1: p. 120] Budget responsibilities took an increasing
amount of time and attention, at the expense of other
legislative activities. Stalemates over fiscal policy and
budget priorities caused missed deadlines. The regular
appropriations process had been replaced by Continuing
1 See Allen Schick, The Capacity to Budget
.
(Washington,
D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1989), Chapter 1, for a
summary of the policy and procedural crisis in federal
budgeting.
Resolutions and omnibus reconciliation packages. There was
clear evidence that the budget process was breaking down. 2
This breakdown has been attributed to the persistent
budget deficit, especially with regard to the inability of
government to ration federal resources that had become so
scarce. The infighting within Congress, and between Congress
and the President, for these resources has destroyed both the
regularity of the process and the traditional roles of not
only the various agencies, but of the branches themselves.
Furthermore, the focus on the deficit has encouraged the use
of budget gimmickry by both the Executive and Legislative
Branches to create the illusion of compliance with the deficit
reduction targets required by the Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings laws,
(GRH I and II)
.
Two decades of budget changes failed to produce a process
that could solve the problem of the reality of the economic
situation or resolve the political conflicts in Washington.
There was a clear consensus that the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as amended by GRH I and II,
was an inadequate framework within which the difficult budget
issues of the 1990' s could be resolved. However, the question
as to how the process should be reformed was not as easy to
answer as it was to reach the agreement that reform was
2There is a huge literature on the breakdown of the
budget process. An excellent discussion may be found in Allen
Schick, The Capacity to Budget , (Washington D.C.: The Urban
Institute Press, 1989), chapter 6.
needed. Much of the disagreement can be attributed to the
debate over which branch should control the "purse strings" of
the Government. Any reform with the potential to make major
changes in the balance of power, Congress versus the
President, was inherently contentious, with support depending
heavily on institutional and partisan loyalties.
The Congressional role in budgeting is clearly established
by the United States Constitution (Article I, Section 9),
which states: "No money may be drawn from the Treasury but in
Conseguence of Appropriations made by Law." The Framers of
the Constitution created a system of "checks and balances" and
deliberately sought to restrain the executive by limiting its
funds. "Only Congress can authorize the government to collect
taxes, borrow money, and make expenditures. The executive
branch can spend funds only for the purposes and amounts
specified by Congress." [Ref. 2: p. 43] The President's role
in the budget process was expanded by the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 to include annual preparation of the
executive budget. It is submitted early in the year and
serves to articulate to Congress and the nation the
Administration's priorities and future policy commitments.
The 1974 Budget and Impoundment Act was not intended to
reduce the deficit or to change federal spending priorities.
It was enacted at a time when the deficit was relatively small
and there was limited concern about its size. [Ref. 3: p. 18]
Instead, the purpose of the law was to introduce the
discipline of a timetable for various phases of the
congressional budget process. Compliance with the schedule
would result in the debate occurring systematically. It was
also intended to provide accountability for budget decisions
through procedures which reconciled taxing and spending with
the actual budget totals. In essence, Congress would make the
details of programs conform with the totals it had chosen.
The Act attempted to rationalize and centralize budget
power in Congress. Instead, that power was further dispersed
and decentralized by the creation of the House and Senate
Budget Committees. The Budget Committees were created to
oversee the budget process and to set spending and revenue
targets for the authorizing committees in an annual
resolution.
In addition to the budget committees, the 1974 Budget and
Impoundment Act created a third entity, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) to assist the House and Senate Budget
Committees. It was established to provide its version of the
economic forecasts and projections to be used by the
committees and to serve as a scorekeeper for monitoring
Congressional spending decisions and revenue actions.
According to Senate Budget Committee Chairman Pete V.
Domenici, R-N.M.:
The core services which we in Congress have come to expect
of CBO have been the provision of cost estimates of bills,
scorekeeping reports, economic forecasts and 5-year
projections, the analysis of the president's budget in its
session review, alternative budget reduction strategies
and more detailed analysis of particular problems and
Federal activities. [Ref. 4: p. 1]
The 1974 Budget Act's impoundment provisions are also
critical to this study. A new procedure formalized and
limited impoundment. 3 Congress could review and control the
use of impoundments by the President. This reform was
included to limit the President's power to control spending,
in particular, President Nixon's impoundment of funds for
programs he did not like. Prior to this, Presidents had
routinely withheld funds for administrative reasons. [Ref. 5:
p. 1393] This tool was based on an understanding that when an
appropriation was no longer necessary or became unserviceable,
the President did not have to spend it, providing Congress
concurred. By refusing to spend billions of dollars in
appropriations he disliked, President Nixon used impoundment
to ". . .rewrite national policy at the expense of Congressional
power and intent." [Ref. 6: p. 12]
As a result of the 1974 Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act the President could either defer the
use of funds unless disapproved by either the House or Senate
or propose the rescission of appropriated funds. 4 "A
impoundment is a generic term referring to any action or
inaction by an officer or employee of the U.S. Government that
precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority in
the manner intended by Congress.
4Deferral of budget authority is the action by the
Executive Branch that delays the obligation of budget
authority beyond the point it would normally occur. The
President must provide advanced notice to the Congress of any
rescission is an executive branch recommendation to cancel
Congressionally approved spending for a program." [Ref. 2: p.
63] It cancels budget authority before the time when the
authority would otherwise cease to be available for
obligation. Rescission would take effect only if enacted into
law within 45 days after being proposed. Unless both houses
approve the rescission, the President must release the funds.
In sum, the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act institutionalized the power of Congress in the
budget process. Through the budget resolution it provided a
mechanism for making over-all decisions on spending
priorities. The timetable permitted "...Congress to review
the federal budget as a whole, relating revenue policies to
spending decisions and setting budget priorities among
competing national programs." [Ref. 2: p. 57] Also
significant was the use of baselines as an alternative to the
President's Budget to evaluate tax and spending decisions.
[Ref. 5: p. 1393]
In practice, however, the process established in the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 had
no enforcement mechanism. Therefore it could not guarantee
compliance with either the timetables or the spending and
revenue targets. Traditionally, Continuing Resolutions were
proposed deferrals. A deferral may not extend beyond the end
of the fiscal year in which the President's message proposing
the deferral is made. Congress may overturn a deferral by
passing a law disapproving the deferral. [Ref. 7: p. 259]
temporary emergency funding measures for federal agencies
whenever Congress had not completed action on one of the
thirteen regular appropriations bills by the start of the new
fiscal year. It got progressively harder each year to pass
the budget reconciliation due to the lengthy debate and the
additional players. Continuing Resolutions, passed after the
budget process timetable deadlines, became the final
appropriations bills for the year. This set a dangerous
precedent. Continuing Resolutions have become "major policy-
making instruments of massive size and scope." [Ref. 2: p. 67]
By deliberately delaying regular appropriations bills to
position them in an Omnibus Continuing Resolution, Congress
further eroded the power of the President in the process. It
was unlikely that the President would veto the package because
he did not like one aspect of it. The President's ability to
lead the budget process was diluted and his budget was no
longer the authoritative one.
Internally, the reform provided for the coordination of
decision making among elements of the legislature that had
proceeded, historically, without coordination. It tried to
bring a centralizing procedure to a fragmented
institutional effort. And it tried to routinize
macroeconomic thinking among all legislative decision
makers. Externally, the reform was intended to redress a
legislative-executive imbalance in budgetary power. It
sought to give the legislature an independent
institutional capacity to make budgetary decisions. It
sought to put the legislature on an egual footing with the
executive to cooperate if possible, to compete if
necessary. [Ref. 8: p. 42]
During the 1980 's the budget deficit continued to grow.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act was not
able to "rein in" Congress's propensity to spend. Congress's
inability to make any spending cuts was further exacerbated by
an overestimation of inflation in calculating tax cuts,
resulting in a loss of revenue to the government. When
combined with increased spending, this resulted in a huge
deficit.
Congress passed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 in desperation over the increasing deficit
and the inability to pass the budget on schedule. Also called
Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings (GRH I)
,
the act called for a zero
deficit by 1991, to be enforced by across-the-board cuts in
defense and non-defense discretionary spending if participants
in the process were unable to meet the targets themselves. 5
Although attention was clearly focused on the budget deficit,
lawmakers continued to avoid making the hard decisions. A
variety of bookkeeping gimmicks, such as forecasting the sale
of assets and revenues which never occurred and moving
military paydays, were used to meet outlay targets. The use
of the baseline concept and other accounting tricks created
the illusion of spending cutbacks, even when expenditures were
greater than in the previous year.
Congressional budget actions were consistently late. The
inability of Congress and the President to reconcile their
5The element of a presidential spending reduction order
that occurs by reducing defense and non-defense spending by
uniform percentages is called a seguester.
differences made the process even less effective. GRH
specified the cutback amounts but not the programs . Although
these cutbacks were mandatory, the lack of enforcement power
is evidenced by the adjustments of the targets when they could
not be met. Furthermore, by focusing on next year's outlays
rather than budget authority, GRH transformed the thinking of
senior federal budget analysts. Most federal programs are
continuous and long-term and were not well-served when split
into one-year increments for decision making. [Ref . 9: pp. 31-
32])
Although only used twice, and in both years the sequesters
were partial ones, in 1990 "...the threat of sequestration
lost credibility, as the deficit estimate and the size of the
required cuts needed to meet the GRH targets grew to
unprecedented size." [Ref. 9: p. 29]
Budget reform was urgently needed to restore regularity
and integrity to the process. Frustration with the process
and the failure of the reforms to control the deficit resulted
in the passage of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA)
.
Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
the BEA, puts in place a comprehensive set of budget process
reforms, including discretionary spending limits, pay-as-you-
go spending for entitlements and revenues, and "categorical
sequestration" to enforce the agreement.
This thesis will examine the perceived need for reform of
the federal budget process. It will first identify the
proposals of the Executive Branch, of the Legislative Branch
and of selected experts from the academic world. The process
as enacted in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, (BEA) , will
then be examined. Finally, the proposals will be compared
with the actual procedural changes, providing a critical
analysis of which faction was in closest agreement.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research guestions for this study are:
What process reforms were proposed, and why? Which were
actually enacted in the BEA?
The following subsidiary research guestions were
formulated to help define the primary research guestions:




How did the proposed reform address the problem?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The emphasis of the thesis is on institutional reform
issues. Discussion is structured around the comparison of
specific proposals for reform of the federal budget process.
An examination of fiscal policy or how much deficit reduction
will be achieved is beyond the scope of this thesis.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This thesis is based in primary budget materials, official
publications of Congress and scholarly writings of budget
experts. These include the Budget of the United States, The
10
Budget in Brief, Hearings of the Senate and House Budget
Committees, Reports of the Congressional Budget Office and the
General Accounting Office from 1980 to 1990, and the scholarly
literature on budget reform. These data are synthesized to
develop a profile of the need for budget reform and an
analysis of what each group wanted. Other bibliographic
searches were conducted as appropriate.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The thesis is organized into six chapters.
Chapter I: Introduction—The background provides a
description of the breakdown in the budget process during the
1980 's and the turmoil caused by GRH I and II. This chapter
also provides a broad introduction, identifies the purpose of
the thesis, and establishes its scope and limitations. The
methodology and organization of the study is also be
presented.
Chapter II: The Presidents' Proposals—This chapter
provides an examination of the recommendations of President
Reagan and President Bush, including enhanced rescission
authority, the line-item veto, the Balanced Budget Amendment
to the Constitution, two-year budgets, joint budget
resolution, and a second sequester.
Chapter III: The Congress—The focus of this section is
limited to specific reforms as proposed by members of Congress
in resolutions or in statements made in hearings on the budget
11
process reform. Specifically, amendments to GRH I and II are
considered. Various approaches to multi-year budgeting,
improved budget numbers and simplification of the process are
discussed. Positions on the Presidents' proposals to revise
the budget process are considered, and where appropriate, new
initiatives are included.
Chapter IV: Budget Reform Theory—This chapter presents a
review of the reforms recommended by selected scholars on the
budget process. Specifically, their responses to proposals
made by members of the Executive and Legislative Branches are
considered. Other budget reform proposals generated by this
group are included.
Chapter V: Presentation of the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990--This chapter describes the specific process reforms
enacted in the BEA.
Chapter VI : Conclusions and Recommendations—This chapter
compares the enactments with the proposals for reform. It
provides a summary of which faction was most successful in
getting its proposals enacted.
The efforts of this research will contribute to the
understanding of the highly complex federal budget process.
It will provide an assessment of which procedural reforms have
been enacted and which failed to become a regular component of
the process. The recommendations which were ignored in 1990
may prove to be important as Congress continues to struggle
with budget issues in the future.
12
II. THE PRESIDENTS' PROPOSALS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine Federal Budget-making process
reforms advocated by President Ronald Reagan and President
George Bush. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the
specific reforms reguested. An explanation of the history of
some of the reforms is provided to give insight into the issue
and the anticipated benefit to the budget process.
The first section of this chapter gives an overview of
President Reagan's use of presidential impoundment power to
control spending. It explains why both he and President Bush
reguested enhanced rescission authority. The second section
will explore the proposal for a presidential line-item veto.
Both Presidents called for procedural changes to the way the
budget is prepared. In the next three sections the following
procedures will be discussed: a constitutional amendment
mandating a balanced Federal budget, two-year budgets, and a
joint budget resolution. Finally, the last section will cover
President Bush's proposal to add a second seguestration
opportunity to eliminate a loophole in the provisions of
Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings.
13
B. ENHANCED RESCISSION AUTHORITY
During the early years of his Presidency, President Reagan
was extremely successful in the use of rescission and
impoundment authority to "pare down" federal programs and
discretionary domestic spending. He made much greater use of
the impoundment process than his predecessors by recommending
the rescission of $15 billion in 1981, more than the total
proposed by Presidents Carter and Ford in the previous six
years. Congress approved $12 billion of this amount, and, by
failing to act, accepted the deferral of an additional $11
billion in that year and the next. [Ref. 10: p. 88] Routine
deferrals, authorized by the Anti-deficiency Act, permitted
withholding of funds when program objectives could be met
while spending less than the full amount authorized. These
early impoundment successes did not continue. In 1981 and
1982, Reagan succeeded in getting Congress to cancel $16
billion in appropriations. In 1983 through 1988 however, he
prevailed on Congress to rescind only $400 million. His
success rate for proposed rescissions dropped from 69 percent
during the first two years to only two percent in 1983-1988.
As a result, Reagan abandoned this budget cutting tool in 1988
and did not propose any further rescissions. [Ref 10: p. Ill]
In 1981 and 1982 Reagan used the impoundment power to his
advantage to control spending. This initial success was
attributed to his popularity and persuasiveness. Congress
took positive action on the President's proposals, giving him
14
the cuts he requested. However, in 1983, the situation
reversed itself. The use of impoundment gave Congress the
tool to control the President. "Rather than acting on the
president's proposals, as it did in the early years of [the
1974 Impoundment Control Act], Congress ... prevailed by
inaction." [Ref. 10: p. 112] The President's ability to
constrain spending was further eroded by the 1987 amendment of
GRH in which Congress terminated the President's power to make
policy deferrals. "Ronald Reagan was the first president in
American history expressly barred from deferring funds to slow
down federal spending or to reduce the deficit." [Ref. 10: p.
113]
This disabling of the cutting tools diminished
presidential power in the budget arena. In the Budget Message
of the President, President Reagan requested enhanced
rescission authority. He proposed reforming the budget
process to require the Congress to take a recorded vote on any
presidentially proposed rescission. This would prevent the
Congress from "...ducking the issue by simply ignoring the
proposed rescission...." [Ref. 11: p. 1-15] Even though
"...the President wouldn't gain any additional power to kill
spending, ...he could force Congress to take a stand publicly
on items that he believes are wasteful." [Ref. 12: p. 83] The
Bush Administration proposals also included this enhanced
rescission authority to force Congress to take a stand on each
of the President's requests.
15
C. LINE-ITEM VETO
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that the
President may exercise his veto over a bill as a whole. There
is no authority to veto parts, or items, of legislation. [Ref
.
13: p. 47] Therefore, to implement the item veto at the
federal level would require a constitutional amendment.
The issue of the power of the President in relation to
that of Congress has historically been a delicate one.
Nevertheless, Reagan relentlessly campaigned for a line-item
veto to reduce appropriations bills so that the President
could "...carve out the boondoggles and pork - those items
that would never survive on their own." [Ref. 14] As Governor
of California Reagan had that power and strongly believed
that, like governors of 43 states, the President should have
the line-item veto. This would give the President the tool to
"...stop this sort of fiscal nonsense.
..
[with] the ability to
reach into those huge expenditure bills and cut out the
waste." [Ref. 15: p. 18-D] In his final Budget Message,
Reagan specifically targeted the massive Continuing
Resolutions and reconciliation bills that had become the norm
in the 1980 's. "These large, cumbersome bills provide cozy
hiding places for hundreds of special interest add-ons, which
line-item authority would permit the President to challenge."
[Ref. 16: p. 1-13] He continued "...[this] authority would
permit the elimination of substantial waste and would be an
16
effective instrument for enforcing budget discipline." [Ref.
16: p. 1-13]
In the 1991 Budget, President Bush took the argument for
the line-item veto one step further, expanding it to include
entitlement programs. These are programs for which the
government is legally obligated to make the required
expenditures, regardless of the annual budget process. Second
only to interest on the national debt, these mandated programs
represent some of the federal government's greatest
expenditures. Otherwise, application of the line-item veto
would be limited to funds for national defense and domestic
discretionary spending programs which depend on annual
appropriations
.
D. BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
In their call for reform of the way Congress handles the
budget, both Presidents Reagan and Bush advocated a
constitutional amendment that mandates a balanced budget and
forces the government to live within its means. "Such an
amendment, once phased in, [would] discipline both Congress
and the Executive branch...", President Bush told Congress in
February 1989 in his address on budget proposals for the FY
1990 budget. [Ref. 17]
17
E. BIENNIAL BUDGETS
Two-year budgets were proposed to save time and to improve
efficiency. In 1986 this was tried on an experimental basis
for defense authorizations and the concept was received
favorably. As generally understood, biennial budgeting meant
that Congress would adopt two-year budgets and appropriations
bills, with the off-years used to review programs through
authorization hearings. [Ref. 18: p. 1714] As Reagan
envisioned the process, the two-year budget cycle would offer
several other advantages: ". . .a reduction in repetitive annual
budget tasks, more time for consideration of key spending
decisions in reconciliation, and less scope for gimmicks such
as shifting spending from one year to the next." [Ref. 11: pp.
1-15 - 1-16]
F. JOINT BUDGET RESOLUTION
President Reagan first proposed the joint budget
resolution in 1988 to improve the budget process. Frustrated
by the routine discarding of the Presidential budget and the
regular disregard of the congressional budget resolution, he
proposed that "...Congress and the Executive collaborate on a
joint resolution that sets out spending priorities within the
receipts available." [Ref. 11, p. 1-15] Bringing the
President into the debate earlier would "...[give] him a
chance to influence the tax and spending outline that shapes
appropriations bills and the reconciliation bill." [Ref. 5: p.
18
1391] The requirement of a Presidential signature or veto
would force both branches of government to resolve policy
differences prior to formulation of appropriations measures.
In his final Budget Message, Reagan was even more specific
about the intention of this proposal:
To ensure the broader scrutiny and stricter discipline
that is needed... I propose that Congress be required to
prepare a budget resolution covering a minimum of two
years showing revenue proposals individually and showing
spending priorities. ... Subsequent legislation which
exceeds these allocations should not be considered without
super-majority approval. [Ref. 16: p. 1-14]
G. SECOND SEQUESTER
President Bush proposed a second sequester after 15
October, the date by which Office of Management and Budget,
under GRH, must decide whether across-the-board spending cuts
were needed to meet that year's deficit target. After that
date, Congress could approve additional spending without the
threat of such cuts. The problem with this process was that
it required trimming the projected, not actual, deficit. Once
the final projection was issued on 15 October, appropriations
or additional spending authority could not trigger
sequestration, no matter how much it affected the deficit.
[Ref. 10: p. 205]
During the first week after the final 0MB deficit report
for fiscal year 1989, the Congress and the President enacted
into law an additional $500 million in spending legislation.
Another $20 billion was appropriated for the Financial
19
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
(FIRREA) , alone and $3 billion in disaster assistance for the
California earthquake disaster was not enacted until after the
final OMB report. [Ref. 19: p. 6] None of this spending was
included in the final OMB fiscal year 1990 deficit estimates.
A second sequester opportunity would require all spending,
regardless of the date, to be included in deficit calculation.
H. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to identify the budget
reform proposals of the Executive Branch. Debate over many of
these, and other requests occurred in the Legislative Branch
and in the academic community.
Most of these proposals would strengthen the President's
role in the Federal Budget-making process. If enacted, the
President would have the tools to influence budget formulation
and content. Opponents of this feared redistribution of
budget power would give the President authority that
constitutionally rested with Congress.
The next chapter studies the response of Congress to the
Presidents' proposals. It examines other solutions offered to




This chapter explores Congressional interest in Federal
Budget reform. Key testimony from the numerous hearings
before committees of both Houses with jurisdiction over the
budget process is discussed. Provisions for reform in several
of the more highly regarded bills introduced in the Senates
are examined in the first section. These include S. 1553, The
Legislative Line-item Veto; S. 29 and S. 391, which provide
different versions of a biennial budget proposal; and S. J.
Resolution 12, calling for an amendment to the Constitution
mandating a balanced federal budget. Other budget reform
proposals are considered, including enhanced rescission
authority and restructuring the committees. The second
section considers two key bills introduced in the House of




In October 1989, the U.S. Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs and the Committee on the Budget met to
conduct a joint hearing to consider ways to improve the
Federal budget-making process. Under a standing order of the
21
Senate, those two committees share jurisdiction over
legislation that would change the budget process.
In his opening statement, Senator Jim Sasser, (D-TN)
,
Chairman of the Committee on the Budget, voiced his belief
that Gramm-Rudman was about to become "...more a part of the
problem than a part of the solution." [Ref. 20: p. 2]
According to Sasser, the Government had ended up with two set
of books in order to give the illusion of progress: one for
the Gramm-Rudman game and a set of books that were the real
books. Gramm-Rudman encouraged the practice of gimmickry to
reach the targets, and he suspected that, in reality, Gramm-
Rudman accomplished neither of its primary objectives: to
impose budget discipline or to constrain the deficit. In his
view, what was needed was:
...a deficit reduction instrument with a broader time
horizon, one less subject to manipulation, and one that
builds its constraints more organically into the process
rather than imposing them artificially at the end. [Ref.
20: p. 3]
He was referring to the fact that a sequester had been
triggered two days prior to the hearing. The Gramm-Rudman
constraint of the threat of sequester at the end of the
process encouraged procrastination and "...the kind of end-
game stalemate" they were experiencing at the time. [Ref. 20:
p. 3]
The essence of Sasser' s concern with GRH was that it
had a one-year focus which encouraged tricks such as pay
shifts and quick-hit, one-time revenue raisers. Incorporation
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of trust fund surpluses into the unified budget served to mask
the deficit, and the creation of special categories for such
unanticipated, extraordinary expenses as the FSLIC bail-out
contributed to the belief that the will to meet GRH targets
was absent. Lastly, the fact that Gramm-Rudman was governed
by the President's own Office of Management and Budget made
the economic assumptions used by the Administration suspect.
It was felt that the Administration could, and did, manipulate
the savings needed to meet the targets.
Although not discounting the need for additional
reform, Senator Sasser cautioned that the problem with Gramm-
Rudman was that it attempted "...a process solution to a
fundamental problem of political will." [Ref. 20: p. 3]
Continuing his testimony he summarized the problem with the
budget as insufficient funds to operate the Government and
meet the needs of all the constituents or not enough political
will to make the cuts and savings that need to be made.
Senator John Glenn, (D-OH) , Chairman of the Committee
on Governmental Affairs, concurred that improving or over-
hauling the budget-making process would not substitute for
mustering the political courage to make the tough budgetary
policy choices that needed to be made. He did, however,
support reorienting the way the budget was measured, the way
budgetary decisions were made, and the way the impact of the
budget on the economy was assessed. He felt this
reorientation would create a climate more favorable for
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achieving truly enduring deficit reduction. [Ref. 20: p. 6]
Glenn looked further to the Executive Branch for the kind of
leadership that would result in truth in budgeting. He, too,
criticized accounting gimmickry and phony results based on
unrealistic, optimistic assumptions.
The proposals heard by the Committees covered a wide
range of potential remedies for budget-making reform,
including the proposals by the Administration to give the
President enhanced rescission authority or line-item veto, and
to move to a biennial budget. Other solutions proposed
included transforming the GRH deficit reduction process,
shifting to capital budgeting, and restructuring the
Congressional Committee system.
Testimony reflected widespread sentiment in both
parties that repeal or overhaul of GRH was necessary.
However, the range and diversity of the proposals to achieve
the desired discipline did not have the same unifying theme.
Instead, much of the disagreement over how to effect change
could be attributed to both institutional and partisan
loyalties. Because redistribution of budget power is inherent
in budget reform, to change the rules and procedures would
also influence who has the final say, who controls public
funds, and how disputes are resolved.
Fighting over power is simply another means of fighting
over money, but with higher stakes. The recent budgetary
relationship of the President and Congress has been marked
by intense conflict over fiscal policy and spending
priorities. The checks and balances available to the
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contending branches have led to a protracted stalemate in
which neither side has been able to fully impose its
budget preferences on the other. [Ref. 21: p. 60]
2. Enhanced Rescission Authority
In 1989 Senator Dan Coats, (R-IN) , and Senator John
McCain, (R-AZ) , co-authored a piece of budget reform
legislation, S. 1553. The Legislative Line-Item Veto was a
compromise version of several different enhanced rescission
bills that were pending before the Senate and House of
Representatives. It left the rescission procedure of the
Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1974 in place, but added
an improved procedure which expanded the President's range of
options. Under the provisions of the bill, the President
would be able to rescind, in whole or in part, budget
authority not previously rescinded in that fiscal year. This
would give the President two opportunities to cut
Congressional "pork". He would be able to submit rescissions
at the beginning of each year with the Presidential Budget.
He would also be able to review all appropriations bills and
send up rescissions within twenty days of signing each bill.
The rescissions would go into effect unless both houses of
Congress passed a resolution of disapproval within twenty
days; however, the President could veto that resolution of
disapproval. As with any other bill, it would require a two-
thirds vote to override.
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I n addition to expediting the procedures by
disallowing amendments and limiting debate, should the
President recommend .1 rescission it would be effective unless
overturned, rather than being not effective unless Congress
approves it. Although entitled The Legislative Line-Item
Veto, to address the issue of constitutionality, S. 1553 used
the existing rescission law as its base. It changed the
burden Ol proof by adding the reguirement for a resolution of
disapprove] to stop the President's recommended rescissions.
Senator Coats d i d not view this reform as a shift in
power l torn Congress to the Executive Branch in an unequal way.
The propose] would provide the President an enhanced
rescission type of power under a new title that would be an
effect Lve way to cut spending. By equalizing the distribution
ot power between the two branches, this authority would
preclude Congress adding unnecessary spending projects that
would not receive a maiority of support on the Floor of the
Senate or House to B bill which the President otherwise had to
sign. [ Ret . :o: pp. 4 2-44 ]
Opponent s ol the concept of enhanced rescission objected
to the President being able to rescind part of an
appropriation. They believed this would give the President
authority that constitutionally rested with the Congress.
Regardless, the trust rat ion with the deficit and complaints
about an omnipotent Congress gave the proposal 40 votes in a
test vote in the Senate in November 1989. [Ref. 5: p. 1393]
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Coats believed "...[enhanced rescission power] would impose a
lot more restraint on Members." [Ref. 5: p. 1393]
3. The Line-item Veto
The debate over whether to give the President the
line-item veto was similar in principle to that over enhanced
rescission authority. It was based on both partisan loyalty
and on the institutional approach. The line-item veto was
considered much more dangerous to the balance of power than
enhanced rescission. A line-item veto reguires two-thirds of
both houses to overturn, whereas a simple majority vote in
both houses could reject an enhanced rescission. [Ref. 5: p.
1394] Senator Glenn voiced concern about the possibility of
a very politically-oriented President using a line-item veto
as a weapon against particular members of Congress against
whom he wanted to take some action or force into votes on
specific projects. [Ref. 20: p. 45] This increased leverage
over individual lawmakers could be a problem especially when
control of the branches was divided. Those who opposed line-
item veto did so because they perceived it to be a potential
"policy weapon" rather than a deficit-cutting tool.
The line-item veto was more popular among Republicans
whose priorities were less likely to clash with those of the
Republican President than among the Democrats. [Ref. 5: p.
13 94] There was support among the Democrats however. Senator
James Exon, (D-NC) , introduced S. 354 which would give the
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President line-item veto authority for continuing
appropriations for a two-year trial period. This trial would
give both Congress and the President the opportunity to
evaluate whether such authority unadvisedly tipped the balance
of power. Under the provisions of this bill Congress could
vote to overturn the President's action on important items
during this trial period. In July of 1990, the Senate Budget
Committee reported out, by a vote of 13-6, a measure by
Senator Ernest Hollings, (D-SC) , to give the President the
power to veto individual items in appropriations. [Ref. 22:
p. 2385]
4. The Biennial Budget
A two-year budget had wide support in the Senate
although there were differing views as to how it should be
implemented. These views can be grouped into three variations
of the two-year budgeting proposal. One plan provided for a
"stretch", with Congress and the President spreading current
budget negotiations over a two-year period. This plan
received limited attention. S. 29, co-authored by Senator
Wendell Ford, (D-KY) , and Senator William V. Roth, Jr., (R-
DE) , was a split-session proposal, providing for the President
and Congress to spend one year setting the budget and then one
year concentrating on other matters. Senator Pete Domenici's
S. 391 could be called a summit proposal, with provisions for
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a biennial budget agreement and annual appropriations. [Ref.
20: pp. 22-23]
Once phased in, under S. 29, the President would
submit his budget recommendations on the first Monday after 3
January of each odd-numbered year. Congress would enact a
two-year budget resolution, two-year appropriations bills, and
a two-year reconciliation bill in the first session of
Congress. The second session would be devoted to enacting
authorizations and to enhanced oversight by Congress, and to
compliance review by the Executive Branch. The Ford-Roth
proposal assumed that the biennial appropriations would cover
all federal appropriations. In his statement, Senator Ford
insisted that "...to obtain the efficiency and advantages of
a two-year budgetary cycle, biennial appropriations should be
applied as broadly as possible." [Ref. 20: p. 141]
Under the provisions of S. 29, the procedures and
discipline of GRH were retained. Existing timetables were not
changed. Any sequestration order which became final in the
first session of a Congress would impact the odd-numbered
fiscal year only. In order to allow the economy the
opportunity to correct itself or allow Congress to take
corrective action, the need for a sequester in the even-
numbered fiscal year of the biennium would not be determined
until the second session of Congress. Senator Ford stated
that corrective action could take the form of supplemental
appropriations measures, including offsetting spending cuts
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where necessary, revised authorizations or existing GRH
procedures. [Ref. 20: p. 143]
The only other action required in the second year of
the biennium was the completion of action on bills and
resolutions authorizing new budget authority for the
succeeding biennium. This deadline was purely advisory; there
is no statutory requirement that authorizations be concluded
by the last day of the second session of Congress. This bi-
partisan proposal, which had 38 co-sponsors, did not alter the
power balance between the two branches. Senator Ford believed
that the opportunity for oversight and in-depth review of
existing programs could result in program changes and
reauthorizations that could save dollars. This oversight
would also enable Congress to define Federal priorities which
would ultimately lead to budgetary savings. Authorization
committees would actually gain sufficient leverage to
influence policy decisions and program implementation at
executive agencies. [Ref. 20: pp. 142-143]
S. 391, the Domenici-Johnston Congressional Budget
Reform Act of 1989, reformulated the budget resolution as a
two-year resolution, with planning totals for Budget
Authority, outlays, and revenues for the subsequent two years.
To strengthen the resolution, it would be a joint resolution
requiring Presidential signature. It provided for, but did
not require, a revised budget resolution at the beginning of
the second year. Unlike the Ford-Roth proposal, this bill
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would maintain one-year appropriations but did not preclude
two-year bills.
In its review of the proposals for reforming federal
budgeting practices, GAO endorsed macro-level biennial
budgeting as " . . .perhaps the best opportunity for streamlining
the budget process." [Ref. 23: p. 27] The benefit of biennial
budgeting at this level was that it permitted the President
and Congress to focus on broad policy issues without getting
bogged down in the innumerable details of appropriations
bills.
GAO also recommended consideration of biennial
budgeting, in conjunction with annual appropriations, as a
possible means to reduce the congressional budget workload and
allow more time for oversight and other legislative
activities. It recommended a timetable similar to the one
proposed in the Ford-Roth proposal should Congress decide to
switch to a biennial schedule. The report recommended testing
the concept on organizations with operations and programs that
were relatively stable and with no obvious impediments to
biennial budgeting.
GAO preferred concentration of budget activity in the
first session of Congress and oversight in the second session.
This would allow:
• difficult budget votes to come in a non-election year
• permit budgets to be adopted during the first year of a
President's term and at the start of a new Congress
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• give a new President and Congress the ability to more
quickly enact their programs, rather than having to
operate two years under an earlier approved budget [Ref
.
23: p. 28]
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on
biennial budgeting did not support the expectation that
biennial budgeting would increase dramatically the efficiency
of the Congressional budget process. According to CBO, the
increased uncertainty resulting from expanding the budget
horizon by a year would increase errors in budget projections.
Another stated drawback to biennial budgeting was that it
would limit cooperation between the legislative and executive
branches because it reduced interaction. Furthermore, the
report cited the reduced amount of influence that Congress
could exercise annually. In the absence of annual
appropriations, Congress would lose its coercive tool over the
President in budget negotiations. Despite these objections,
the CBO report offered several potential advantages to
biennial budgeting:
• Congress could reduce the number of repetitive votes on
budget issues
• Congress could spend more time on policy planning and
oversight
• More efficient spending [Ref. 24: pp. 73-75]
5. Restructuring the Committees
Proponents of those bills containing provisions to
reform the committee structure sought to make Congress's work
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more efficient and effective. In their omnibus reform bill,
(S. 391) , Senators Domenici and Johnston proposed replacing
the existing Senate and House Budget Committees with a Joint
Committee on the Budget composed of both House and Senate
leaders
.
Senator Nancy Kassenbaum, (R-KS) , and Senator Daniel
Inouye, (D-HI) , introduced a bill to clarify the chain of
command for decision making and to return to the Senate
leadership a measure of power. Without this, they believed
the impact of the other procedural modifications would be
limited. [Ref. 20: pp. 148-149] Their bill would make the
Budget Committee a priority committee composed of chairmen of
other committees and it would consolidate the authorizing and
appropriating process into individual legislative committees.
Authorization legislation would be reported out with
appropriation language included. Their purpose was to speed
up the legislative process and to reduce the need for
repetitious debate and redundant decisions. The third major
change was to restructure committee jurisdictions so that
standing committees would cover a single, broad policy area.
6. Balanced Budget Proposals
Since 1969 over 400 balanced-budget resolutions have
been introduced by members in both Houses of Congress. Faced
with recession in 1979 and 1980, Congress began to look
seriously at a balanced budget resolution. Although hearings
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were conducted in 1987 and 1988, the Senate did not take any
resolution to the floor.
Proponents of the balanced budget amendment called for
an amendment to the Constitution which required that outlays
not exceed receipts in any fiscal year. Under the provisions
of S.J. Resolution 12, introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond,
(R-SC) , Congress would be allowed to adopt a specific level of
deficit by a three-fifths vote. Approval of any bill to raise
taxes would require a majority of the whole number of both
Houses of Congress by roll call vote. Finally, Congress could
waive the provisions of the amendment during times of war.
Senator Thurmond stated that "...Congress has proven that it
is unwilling to operate on a pay-as-you-go basis. ...Therefore
we must write the rule of fiscal responsibility. We need a
constitutional amendment for that purpose." [Ref. 25: p. 10]
Quoting Thomas Jefferson, Senator Orrin Hatch, (R-UT)
,
indicated he thought the national debt was probably the most
important single issue facing the country: " 'The public debt
is the greatest of dangers to be feared by a republican
government. 1 " [Ref. 25: p. 2] The concept of the balanced
budget was a part of traditional American fiscal policy.
Abandonment of this fundamental policy "...contributed to the
present situation in which there is insufficient external
constraint upon the ability to our Congress to spend." [Ref.
25: p. 3] By requiring a vote in behalf of new taxes in order
to accommodate new programs, Members of Congress would no
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longer be free to submit to the political pressure of special
interest groups. He looked to a balanced budget amendment not
as a panacea, but as "...a necessary step toward putting
America's fiscal house in order." [Ref. 25: p. 3]
Speaking for the opposition, Senator Howard
Metzenbaum, (D-OH) , called the idea "...a phony,...
a
gimmick, ... the latest example of constitutional politics."
[Ref. 25: p. 4] Concerned that the balanced budget would be
unworkable and unenforceable, he felt that Members of Congress
must stop playing games with the American people. A balanced
budget could be achieved only through political will to do
what is necessary.
7. Other Budget Reform Proposals
One additional proposal is significant to this study.
This is the proposal to eliminate the loophole created by the
October 15th sequestration date. Senator Kent Conrad, (D-ND)
,
testified that a "look-back" sequestration would discourage
Congress from shifting funding into the current year once the
sequestration window had passed. Under the provisions of this
proposal, OMB would look at the fiscal year just completed and
determine whether Congressional action caused the deficit to
increase. [Ref. 20: pp. 71-74]
Other proposals were introduced in the Senate to
improve the federal budget process through changed accounting
practices or presentation of information. Those pertain more
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to fiscal policy and deficit reduction than to budget-making
and are not included in this discussion.
C. THE HOUSE
1. Background
The Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security
of the Committee on Government Operations conducted a series
of hearings on reform of the Federal budget process in 1987.
In his opening statement, Chairman Jack Brooks, (D-TX)
,
declared the purpose of the hearing to be determination of
whether the problem was a flawed budget process or simply the
product of inaccurate or unrealistic budget numbers. [Ref . 26:
p. 1] Another hearing on Budget process reform was held
before the Task Force on Budget Process, Reconciliation and
Enforcement of the Committee on the Budget in March 1990.
Chairman Marty Russo, (D-IL) , charged the Task Force with
exploring the reason why neither the President nor the
Congress were responsibly carrying out their duty to formulate
and implement a budget for the Government of the United States
and to examine what could be done to improve the budget
process.
Both Congressman Russo and Congressman Leon Panetta,
(D-CA) , introduced a version of a budget process reform bill
in the 101st Congress. Although both bills contained
provisions to eliminate the use of gimmicks, the features that
distinguish the bill are the means to change the Gramm-Rudman
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sequestration process and how to reduce the deficit to an
appropriate level.
2. Enhanced Rescission Authority
There was limited support for enhanced rescission
authority in the House of Representatives. It presented a
particular dilemma for conservative Republicans who
"...espouse the prerogatives of a strong legislature against
the encroachments of the executive." [Ref. 5: p. 1394] This
conservative split divided the Republicans into those who were
frustrated that the Republican President could not get his way
with a Democratically-controlled Congress and wanted to
strengthen his tools, and those who took the more
institutional approach.
On April 30, 1987 Congressman Trent Lott, (R-MS)
,
House Minority Whip, introduced a bill to improve the
congressional budget and appropriations process. His proposal
gave the President special rescission authority over any long-
term continuing appropriations for two or more regular
appropriations bills for more than 30 days. Under the
provisions of this bill, the President could submit a special
rescission measure within three days after a Continuing
Resolution was enacted. The rescission would take effect
unless a joint resolution was enacted disapproving all or part
of the rescission message within 20 days. This would force
Congress to act on rescissions: to either approve or
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disapprove thorn. [Ref. 26: p. 343] Should Congress adjourn
without completing action on a rescission message, the Budget
Authority would bo held until tho noxt session ol Congress, at
which time the President could resubmit the message. Besides
taking aim at the "pork" and special projects embedded in
omnibus reconcili.it ion bills, this bill would provide an
incentive to pass individual appropriations bills on time
rather than relying on Continuing Resolutions.
3. Line-item Veto
Enhancing the Presidential role in the budget process
through the line- item veto raised concerns similar to those
generated by proposals regarding rescission. Opposition to it
was not purely partisan. Congressman Tom Foley, (D-WA) , spoke
fOJ tha ma iot ity who felt that the line-item veto would
...have very little to do with reducing deficits but would
be used instead to vastly increase the President's control
over policy, in effect requiring every minute
congressional decision to be either supported by the
President or passed by a two-thirds majority. [Ref. 26: p.
262]
Congressman Jamie Whitten, (D-MS) , Chairman of the
House Appropri.it ions Committee also opposed the line-item
vet :
The line item veto is another panacea proposed. If the
Prasidant were given the power to withhold or approve, we
had iust as well abolish Congress. For the President to
propose and the Congress to dispose is deeply set in the
Const ltution. [Ref. 26: p. 297]
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A proponent of increased Presidential authority,
Congressman Richard Armey, (R-TX) , attributed the problem with
the budget process to
...the Budget Act of 1974, which... was enacted precisely
for, (1) cutting the President out of the process and
leaving spending exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the Congress, with the President's participation being
limited to veto authority, and (2) the enormous growth in
entitlements. [Ref. 27: p. 3]
The opposition of high-profile Republicans such as Congressmen
Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma and Willis Anderson of Ohio to the
line-item veto limited its popularity in the House. [Ref. 5:
p. 1392]
4. The Biennial Budget
The biennial budget proved to be much less popular in
the House than it was in the Senate. It met with much
resistance in the House, especially from the standing
committees and the Appropriations Committee. The inherent
opposition to a two-year budget resulted from segments of the
Congress that liked to deal with budget issues and those
constituencies on a year-to-year basis. According to
Congressman Panetta, this allowed them "...to satisfy their
political requirements back home." [Ref. 26: p. 322]
Congressman Panetta co-sponsored H.R. 22 with Congressman
Ralph Regula, (R-OH) , in 1987. H.R. 22 would authorize and
appropriate funds for a biennium in one appropriation act.
What distinguished the Panetta bill from either of the Senate
versions previously discussed was the time-schedule it
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proposed. The oversight function would occur during the first
session of a new Congress, with budget formulation activities
occurring in the second session. Therefore the new Congress
and a new President would inherit 20 months of a previous
Congress's (and President's) budget. [Ref. 28: p. 31] Because
Congress would be seeking re-election during the budget
formulation phase, difficult decisions would not be made.
In 1990, neither Russo nor Panetta specifically
addressed the biennial budget issue. Instead, both bills
required five-year budgets and enforcement to eliminate the
gimmicks associated with trying to meet annual deficit
targets. The Panetta bill proposed both one- and five-year
targets to counter a primary criticism of GRH that it inspires
"budgetary myopia." [Ref. 29: p. 573]
5. Restructuring the Committees
Although the proposal was not contained in any of the
bills introduced for consideration by the House, Congressman
Anthony Beilenson, (R-CA) , submitted a restructuring statement
for the 1987 Hearings. He had chaired the Rules Committee
Task Force on the Budget Process from 1982 to 1984. He
concluded that the single most important step that could
improve the effectiveness of the budget process in the House
of Representatives would be to change the composition and role
of the Budget Committee. He proposed disbanding the existing
Committee and replacing it with a panel made up of the
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chairmen and perhaps a few ranking members of the Ways and
Means and the Appropriations Committees. Those two committees
have jurisdiction over all revenues and 90 percent of all
spending. The other members would be several chairmen and
ranking minority members of committees with jurisdiction over
budget-related legislation. The Chairman would be appointed
by the Speaker of the House; Beilenson suggested the Majority
Leader. [Ref. 26: pp. 377-381]
Congressman Beilenson believed this change would make
the process work more smoothly because the leadership and
senior members of the tax and spending committees would have
more direct involvement in the budget process.
6. Balanced Budget Proposals
Proponents of the concept of a balanced budget
constitutional amendment believed that Congress was no longer
able to control the Federal budget problem through existing
statutory means. Backers said the amendment was vital to
counter the propensity of Congress to increase spending.
Congressman Charles Stenholm, (D-TX) , and other supporters
argued that it would give Congress the budget backbone it
lacked. He was quoted as saying: "[W]e do not have [courage
and guts] and we have not shown it. We need some help and an
extra tool." [Ref. 30: p. 2234]
Those opposing a balanced budget amendment believed
the problem was in the political process. Balanced budget
41
amendment proposals provided an easy substitute for making
difficult choices and striving for an effective, accountable
government. Fluctuating economic conditions make it
impossible to guarantee a balanced budget based on projections
made at the beginning of the fiscal year. Some also opposed
the fact that enforcement would be the responsibility of the
Judiciary, involving Federal judges and the Supreme Court in
the budget-making process. [Ref. 7: p. 257]
Because H.R. 268 was rejected by the House in July
1990, the prospect for the balanced budget amendment reaching
the Senate Floor was not bright.
7. Other Budget Reform Proposals
The Panetta Bill, H.R. 3929, was much more than a
proposal to change the length of the budget and enforcement
periods. It was actually a comprehensive package which would
completely overhaul the existing process. To provide honest
deficit totals the plan would immediately remove Social
Security from the calculations. It would dispose of Gramm-
Rudman and its seguestration threat and replace it with
alternative budget cutting procedures. Rather than mandating
annual deficit targets, the plan provided the amount to be cut
annually. Any inflation adjustments or increased spending or
tax cuts would have to be offset by alternative spending cuts
or tax hikes under Panetta ' s pay-as-you-go plan. The other
important provision was the reguirement that Congress use CBO
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figures in its work instead of the overly optimistic economic
projections from OMB. [Ref. 29: pp. 571-573]
D. SUMMARY
The Senate and the House of Representatives had a
proprietary interest in retaining the Congressional power of
the purse. As a result, support for the President's proposals
was generally limited to partisan sympathy for a Republican
President thwarted by a Congress controlled by the Democrats.
This chapter summarized Congressional debate over budget
process reform. Within the Legislative Branch there was a
clear consensus that additional reform was necessary. The
proposals attempted to find a way to introduce discipline to
the process by creating an effective framework within which
the difficult issues could be resolved.
Diverse priorities and individual agendas precluded
achieving this goal. The next chapter studies the need for
reform from the perspective of selected experts from the
academic world.
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IV. BUDGET REFORM THEORY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will present a review of the reforms
recommended by selected scholars of the budget process. Their
responses to the proposals made by members of the Executive
and Legislative Branches will be discussed. The chapter
concludes with a summary of the initiatives generated by this
group.
The experts referred to include Alice M. Rivlin of the
Brookings Institution, former director of the Congressional
Budget Office. Rudolph G. Penner, Senior Fellow, The Urban
Institute, also former director of the CBO, testified before
Congress on budget process reform and has written extensively
on that subject. He co-authored the book entitled Broken
Purse Strings with Alan J. Abramson. Reform as proposed by
Allen Schick, a professor of Public Policy at the University
of Maryland is also included. He is considered by many to be
one of the leading experts on budgeting. What this chapter
explores is the range of theoretical solutions to budget
reform proposed by budget experts who are psychologically
distanced from the day to day tumult of the budget process and
its partisan strife and can afford to look for the best
solutions to problems in the budget process.
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B. ENHANCED RESCISSION AUTHORITY
All three authors favored strengthening the role of the
President in the budgeting process. Both Penner and Rivlin
were proponents of the enhanced rescission authority so
strongly desired by the executive branch. Penner thought that
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
actually lessened the President's power to impound funds by
defining impoundment powers very precisely. Enhanced
rescission power would be a way to increase the President's
power not to spend money because it would reguire Congress
"...to go on the record and say that spending that the
President says is not worthwhile is indeed worthwhile. That
would be valuable discipline." [Ref. 27: p. 23] Although
Rivlin doubted that the proposal would have a major effect on
the size of the budget, enhanced rescission authority seemed
a good idea to her. [Ref. 26: p. 152]
Schick believed that the impoundment control process was
in need of repair. He claimed that "[a]s a general rule, I do
not like arrangements that compel or prevent Congress from
acting according to its will." [Ref. 26: p. 115] His concern
was enactment of this proposal to force Congress to vote on
rescissions would enable the President to reopen issues
previously decided in the appropriations process. This could
be mitigated depending on the specific manner in which it was
implemented. If Congress was compelled to vote separately on
each proposed rescission, Congress might be overloaded by
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rescissions and subject to presidential pressure on particular
projects. Conversely, if Congress was permitted to package
numerous rescissions together into a single vote, it might be
able to blunt the President's enhanced rescission power. He
felt that if Congress was inclined to go along with the
President, it would vote for rescission even if it were not
reguired to do so. As had been the case during the latter
years of the Reagan Presidency, without Congressional support
most rescissions would likely be rejected. Therefore, even
though Schick endorsed the concept, like Rivlin he did not
expect it to have a significant impact on the budget. [Ref.
26: p. 115]
C. LINE-ITEM VETO
Their views on the line-item veto were largely consistent
and reinforcing. Because it could be used to influence under
40 percent of federal spending, the line-item veto was not
viewed as a potent tool to control total spending. [Ref. 31:
p. 121] The same objection raised by opponents in Congress
was raised by this contingent. The Presidents' reguest for
the line-item veto was intended to enable the President to
counter Congress's proclivity to spend more on favored
projects. According to Schick, because Congress saw the item
veto as affecting the distribution of budgetary power there
was no prospect of it being enacted. "Asking for this power
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is more a way of bashing Congress on the budget than doing
something about the problem." [Ref. 10: p. 214] 6
Penner * s position on the line-item veto was predicated on
the assumption that his other proposals would be effective in
creating a process in which Congress no longer resorted to
huge omnibus bills. Appropriations bills would be enrolled by
title so that the President could exercise his existing veto
power, Otherwise, he said "...the case for an item veto would
be much stronger." [Ref. 31: p. 122]
D. THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
The experts on the budget process agreed that any sort of
mechanical approach to budget-making encouraged the dishonesty
and gimmicks for which GRH had been criticized. They were
therefore united in their opposition to an amendment to the
Constitution mandating a balanced federal budget. The
amendment would not improve the process or solve the deficit
problem. Rivlin testified that in fact, to be tied
6In actuality, Schick did not endorse restoration of
presidential budget clout by any legal rule. Restoration of
that clout depended more on political behavior than on legal
rules. To constrain Congressional spending, the President
must be perceived to be a fair and realistic guardian of the
treasury, as someone who does not disproportionately favor
some claims over others, or whose budgets are intended to out-
maneuver Congress. Only then will the President have an
effective voice in Congressional budget decisions. [Ref. 10,
pp. 215-216)
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to a particular number in any given year. . .can lead to the
wrong fiscal policy for the state of the economy, and it
can lead to phoniness in budget decision making. [Ref . 26:
p. 119]
Allen Schick argued that not only was a deficit of one to
two percent of Gross National Product, (GNP) , acceptable, but
also that there was no compelling political reason to exclude
the Social Security funds from deficit calculations. [Ref. 10:
p. 200] He recommended that the government address this issue
later, before the size of the retirement population grows, and
stated that
...at a time when politicians have difficulty coping with
the overall budget deficit, it does little good to urge
them to tackle the task of eradicating the much larger on-
budget deficit. [Ref. 10: p. 201]
E. MULTI-YEAR BUDGETING
The theorists agreed that Federal budgeting in effect then
was too short-sighted, as it emphasized the impact on deficit
reduction at the expense of longer-term planning. The benefit
of multi-year budgeting would be greater efficiency in
government programs due to increased consideration of their
long-run implications. [Ref. 31: p. 115] Rather than
prescribing a rigid, comprehensive two-year budget process,
Penner and Abramson recommended expanding the use of two-year
authorizations and appropriations. If results demonstrated
the effect of economic uncertainty was not significant, they
believed it would be conceivable that a comprehensive two-year
system could be adopted. [Ref. 31: p. 117]
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Schick suggested an approach to the budget cycle similar
to one in Sweden. Under the provisions of this approach,
multi-year authorizations and budget resolutions would coexist
with annual appropriations. As Schick described it, the
Swedish approach began its three-year budget cycle with a
review of each spending agency's past performance. Then an
understanding was negotiated on policies and resources for the
next three years. In the intermediate years, annual
appropriations would be subjected to less intensive
legislative review unless there was a major departure from the
agreement. Use of a multi-year budget could constrain
entitlement spending because it would provide more lead time
for committees to consider major changes. Savings would be
computed on a fully implemented basis, with emphasis on the
long-term impact of adjustments instead of the period
immediately ahead. [Ref. 10: pp. 220-221]
Rivlin advocated moving the whole budget process to a two-
year cycle in order to give legislators the opportunity to
make significant changes. The longer budgeting period would
give greater scope to the designing and implementing of major
shifts in direction, which could not be accomplished in a
single year. [Ref. 26: pp. 137-138]
F. JOINT BUDGET RESOLUTION
A strong advocate of enhanced Presidential power in the
budget process, Penner recommended going to a joint, rather
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than concurrent, budget resolution which the President could
either sign or veto. Bringing the President into the process
very early would give him or her a stake in enforcing the
resolution once it was passed. [Ref. 27: p. 21]
Schick saw the joint resolution as a transformation of a
set of guidelines into a statutory decision dependent on other
legislation for its revenue and spending policies. "Making
the resolution into a statute would enhance its status and
possibly that of the overall Congressional budget process as
well." Involving the President might "...spur timely budget
negotiation with Congress." However, it does not guarantee
agreement on budget priorities and according to Schick,
"...converting to a statutory resolution would substantially
escalate the risk of breakdown in the congressional budget
process." [Ref. 10: pp. 214-215]
G. SEQUESTRATION
Of all the provisions of GRH, seguestration is the one
that the experts found the most detrimental to honest,
responsible budget-making. It reduced the chance for
negotiation and allowed the legislators to avoid
responsibility by hiding behind a formula.
Citing the enormous effort, time, and intellectual
ingenuity devoted to attempts to get around mechanical
approaches to deficit reduction, Penner concluded that it
would be preferable to return to old approaches to budgeting.
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He acknowledged deficiencies in pre-GRH procedures and
proposed simplification of the old approach to make it less
time consuming. [Ref. 27: p. 38]
According to Rivlin, GRH was enacted out of frustration.
The purpose of setting firm budget goals and establishing
seguestration as a punitive act for not meeting those goals
was to force the compromises necessary to eliminate at least
the unified budget deficit. Although a well-intentioned
effort, she believed it was doing more harm than good:
If I were queen for a day I would say to the Congress,
scrap Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and return to the process that
preceded it. You do not need specific dollar targets.
You do not need the bizarre threat of sequestration. [Ref.
27: p. 5]
However, if GRH with sequestration in it was to be retained,
she endorsed changing the formula to include revenues in a
major way. Rivlin felt that defense ought to take more of a
cut since that was happening anyway. Providing agreement
could be reached on where they were starting from, she
recommended focusing on budget-deficit reduction instead of on
the short-run bias of a particular target. [Ref. 27: p. 18]
Her colleague at the Brookings Institution, Henry Aaron,
testified at the same hearing that Congress should get rid of
Gramm-Rudman as soon as possible "... [o]r move to another kind
of stick that does not involve sequestration." [Ref. 27: p.
19]
Schick concurred that "GRH should be overhauled or
scrapped altogether." [Ref. 10: p. 206] The advantage in
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preset deficit targets was negated by the distortions of GRH.
He did not believe that revenue or spending action should be
considered a saving unless it would reduce the deficit both in
the year for which sequestration was pending and in the
outyears
.
H. RESTRUCTURING THE COMMITTEES
Alice Rivlin proposed major restructuring of the
committees to improve the budget process. She advocated
consolidating "...authorization and appropriation functions,
to have one set of spending committees that dealt with areas
of spending in the budget, including entitlements." [Ref. 26:
p. 118] Under the existing structure, entitlement spending
was outside the appropriations process.
This consolidation would reduce the load for the tax
committee, which handled the bulk of entitlement spending.
The revenue committees would handle only revenue programs.
The budget committees would develop the overall budget
strategy that would include both revenue and spending. The
budget committees would also be tasked to consider relative
priorities among programs and recommend appropriate fiscal
policy.
As part of their overall plan to simplify the budget
process, Penner and Abramson recommended a Joint Budget
Committee to prepare and present the same budget resolution to
both houses of Congress. [Ref. 27: p. 38] They specifically
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endorsed Senator Domenici's plan as a means to simplify the
process and make it less time consuming. The resolution would
contain fewer spending categories in order to minimize the
amount of time spent early in the process arguing over narrow
budget functions.
The success of the budget resolution would depend on the
composition of the joint committee. The resolution would be
more easily enforced if the committee consisted of those
members who are most important in formulating congressional
budget strategy. Maximum prestige and power would be derived
from a membership which included the majority and minority
leaders of each house, the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the Appropriations and revenue committees, as well
as the most recent chairmen and ranking members of the House
and Senate Budget Committees. Initially, the position of
Chairman of this new joint committee would alternate between
the former Budget Committee chairmen. The majority party
would be allowed to appoint two additional members, one from
each house, in order to give that party majority
representation on the committee. In the event of a divided
Congress, the committee would be evenly split. Under the
provisions of this proposal, the role of Appropriations and
tax-raising committees would be enhanced and the trend of
erosion of power of the authorizing committees would continue.
[Ref. 31: pp. 112-113] Penner did not advocate combining
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Authorization and Appropriations into one committee that would
perform both functions for individual budget categories.
I. OTHER BUDGET REFORMS
The experts all saw the need to develop a system of
economic projections that do not provide the incentive for
gimmickry and escapism in budget formulation. Rivlin proposed
a common forecast to which the whole Government would agree,
and use. She believed this common set of assumptions would
tend to be less overly optimistic. Although she did not
identify the specific penalty, she did recommend developing
some mechanism for having the person or part of Government
which was being over-optimistic pay some sort of price for
their position. [Ref. 27: p. 13]
Penner felt that to attempt to devise a technique for
restraining the propensity to be over-optimistic might prove
to be too difficult. Therefore, he suggested that Congress
solicit the recommendation of a nonpartisan board of outside
economists such as the one which already existed to advise the
CBO on its economic forecast. Regardless of the method used,
Penner recommended that once budget aggregates were put in
place they should not be changed during the annual budget
process "...to relieve Congress of the burden of shooting at
a moving target." [Ref. 31: p. 123]
Schick was also a proponent of more objective economic
forecasts. His concern was that forecasts become less
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accurate in the outyears, projecting the deficit dropping and
the country moving toward a balanced budget. He recommended
the use of more conservative forecasting tools but was
"...reluctant to tamper with the discretion of elected
officials to use the forecasts that they want to use." [Ref.
26: p. 107]
Alice Rivlin touted Congressman Panetta ' s bill (H.R. 3929)
as being "...a great improvement over the current process."
[Ref. 27: p. 27] She saw its strength in that it eliminated
sequestration, it made budget gimmickry unrewarding and it
made it difficult to claim credit for short-run savings not
yielding a reduction over five years. She found considerable
merit in the idea that new government services should be paid
for either by increasing revenue or cutting other
expenditures
.
In addition to the reforms discussed, Allen Schick
proposed a two-stage process for budget formulation. In the
first stage the President would present a framework for the
next two years which concentrated on the aggregates and a
small number of cross-cutting categories. Congress would
debate this framework, after which the President and Congress
would settle on an approved framework. In the second stage
the President would submit a detailed budget, followed by
Congressional action on appropriations and other budget
legislation. The advantage of this would be the opportunity
for presidential-congressional cooperation and to allow
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regularization of the events in the budget cycle. [Ref . 10: p.
222]
In 1987 Schick stated that
...the process didn't cause the deficit, but the deficit
has unraveled the budget process. . . .Breakdowns, failure to
meet deadlines, continuing resolutions, are in my
judgment, a direct result of large, overbearing deficits.
[Ref. 26: p. 80]
To reestablish the balance between claiming and rationing
resources, the majority of Schick's other proposals were
designed to strengthen the ability of government to ration.
His proposals included controlling entitlements by de-indexing
transfer payments. Alternatively, he suggested taxing
benefits or making recipients pay for some benefits. [Ref. 10:
pp. 208-209]
Schick also had several proposals for countering the
distortions of baselines. 7 Finally, he recommended shifting
the attention from outlays back to budget authority as part of
the change in emphasis from the short-term deficit reduction
targets of GRH. This would eliminate the temptation to
manipulate the timing of actual payments, (outlays) , in order
to show a lower deficit. [Ref. 10: pp. 217-219] In 1987
Schick urged the Committee on Government Operations to
consider an automatic continuing resolution to take effect
when regular appropriations have not been enacted by the start
7For a complete discussion of these proposals see Allen
Schick, The Capacity to Budget , Washington, D.C.:The Urban
Institute Press, 1990, pp. 210-213)
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of the fiscal year, as well as other changes that would
curtail the recourse to omnibus measures. [Ref. 26: p. 103]
J. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to present the relevant
reforms as proposed by selected members of the group of
experts on the budget process. It should be apparent that
their solutions were more evolutionary in nature than many of
those contained in bills and other legislation proposed in
Congress. Within this community there was a consensus that
reform was clearly indicated and their views on the
implications of change were more consistent than those of the
elected officials.
The next chapter will examine the Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990 and will discuss which process reforms were actually
enacted.
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V. THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 199
A. INTRODUCTION
In November 1990 President Bush and the Congress agreed on
a budget accord designed to reduce the deficit by $500 billion
over the five year period covering Fiscal Years 1991-1995.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, Public
Law 101-508 (5 November 1990) , included multiyear revenue
increases and reductions in entitlement spending and the 13
regular appropriations accounts for Fiscal Year (FY) 1991. To
ensure that the full amount of the savings is achieved and
maintained over this five-year period, new budgetary
procedures were included in the OBRA of 1990. The Budget
Enforcement (BEA) is Title XIII; Titles I through XII do not
relate to the budget process. The BEA amends the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (GRH) , as
amended, and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974, as amended.
The law replaces meeting fixed deficit targets as the
focus of the budget debate with new enforcement mechanisms to
constrain federal spending. It divides the process into two
parts, one for appropriations and another for entitlements and
taxes. All taxing and spending legislation, except Social
Security which has been taken completely off-budget, falls
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into one of these two parts. A series of spending caps govern
appropriations. Pay-as-you-go restrictions govern
entitlements and revenues. [Ref. 32: pp. 61-62]
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the specific
process reforms enacted in the BEA that will alter the way the
budget will be drafted through FY 1995. The major provisions
for budget process reform contained in the BEA include:
discretionary spending limits, pay-as-you-go entitlements and
revenues, multi-year budgeting and enforcement, changed
sequestration procedures and locked-in economic and technical
assumptions. These new enforcement mechanisms will be
discussed in turn. The chapter will conclude with a summary
of the budget agreement and its implications for budget
formulation.
B. THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 19 9
1. Discretionary Spending Limits
The BEA divides discretionary spending in FY 1991-1993
into three categories: domestic, defense, and international.
As shown in Table I, the BEA establishes separate ceilings for
each category for both budget authority and outlays. Programs
within these categories will compete with each other for
funds. Any increase in spending for discretionary programs
must be offset by corresponding spending reductions for one or
more programs within that same category. Spending in one
category can not be reduced in order to pay for programs in
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another category, thus ending the perennial debate over "guns
vs. butter".
Discretionary Spending Caps
(In billions of dollars, by fiscal year)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Defense
Budget authority $288.9 $291.6 $291.8
Outlays 297.7 295.7 292.7
International
Budget Authority 20.1 20.5 21.4
Outlays 18.6 19.1 19.6
Domestic
Budget Authority 182.7 191.3 198.3
Outlays 198.1 210.1 221.7
Total Discretionary
Budget Authority* (491.7) (503.4) (511.5) 510.8 517.7
Outlays* (514.4) (524.9) (534.0) 534.8 540.8
'Budget authority and outlay numbers for the first three years are informational; the law
specifies onry the defense, international and domestic caps for those years.
TABLE I
In 1994 and 1995 the categories merge into one category
for Total Discretionary spending, with total discretionary
budget authority and outlay caps.
The budget resolution may reduce the amount of funding
available to the appropriations committees to an amount less
than the caps. Any reduction in appropriated spending would
necessarily be used to reduce the deficit.
The BEA provides for adjustments to the appropriations
caps at the time the President submits his budget. This
allows for technical consistency, reflecting changes in
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concepts and definitions, changes in inflation, and re-
estimates of federal credit costs. It also provides for
adjustment of the caps to reflect policy decisions made at the
1990 budget summit. The discretionary spending caps may also
be adjusted in Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 by a special budget
authority allowance designed to make provision for estimating
differences between 0MB and CBO. Finally, 0MB may adjust the
caps for what the President and the Congress agree to
designate as "emergencies".
Enforcement of the spending limits is accomplished
through a new sequestration process which requires a "mini-
sequester" only within the category in which a breach
occurred. In the BEA, both budget authority and outlay caps
are binding. Legislation that breaches either will trigger a
sequester.
Under the provisions of the BEA, 0MB must estimate the
cost of any appropriations bill within five days after its
enactment. It is this estimate that controls the process. If
sequester is required, when it takes place depends upon when
the spending occurs. For regular appropriations bills enacted
before Congress adjourns to end a session, the sequester will
occur 15 days after the end of the session. For any
supplemental appropriations bill enacted on or after 1 July
which causes a breach, the sequester to reduce the excess in
that category occurs 15 days after its enactment. For any
supplemental appropriations enacted after 30 June that breaks
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the spending cap, the law requires that the cap for that
category for the next fiscal year be reduced by the amount of
the excess.
The change in the date for general sequestration from
15 October to 15 days after adjournment, combined with the
bill-by-bill review of supplemental appropriations, provides
the mechanism to measure the impact of all discretionary
spending on the deficit.
2 . Pay-As-You-Go Spending
BEA requires that all revenues and direct spending be
"deficit-neutral". 8 The Congress and the President must pay
for all entitlement spending increases and tax cuts with
offsetting entitlement spending cuts or tax increases in the
same fiscal year. Any legislation decreasing revenues or
proposing new direct spending must be offset so that the net
deficit is not increased. CBO must provide OMB an estimate of
the change any direct spending or revenue legislation would
make in outlays or revenues. Within five days of enactment,
OMB will provide to Congress an independent estimate of the
impact on the deficit, with an explanation of any difference
between that estimate and the CBO product. Legislation which
OMB determines to cause a net increase in the deficit will
8Direct spending includes outlays for entitlement
programs, food stamps, and any spending programs not subject
to appropriations.
62
trigger an offsetting, across-the-board sequestration in non-
exempt entitlement programs, including spending for the
National Wool Act, the special milk program, guaranteed
student loans, foster care and adoption assistance, and
medicare. The sequestration would occur 15 days after
Congress adjourned at the end of a session and on the same day
as any sequestration tied to enforcement of the discretionary
spending limits or the deficit targets.
If Congress creates an entitlement program or tax benefit
that is not 'revenue neutral ',... it would then have to
adopt a deficit-cutting 'reconciliation bill' to find the
needed savings. [Ref. 33: p. 2796]
If there is not enough mandatory spending available in the
non-exempt programs for a pay-as-you-go sequester, then a GRH-
type sequester will make up the difference, with cuts
distributed equally between defense and domestic
appropriations
.
Changes in entitlement spending or revenues other than
as a result of legislation do not count under this system.
Pay-as-you-go restrictions do not apply to increases in
entitlement spending that are the result of more persons
meeting the eligibility requirements. This falls into the
category of spending not caused by Congress and therefore
would not trigger sequestration. [Ref. 34: pp. 235-236]
Under the provisions of the BEA, spending is
constrained by points of order that the Senate can waive only
with the affirmative vote of 60 senators. "Points of order
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enforce allocations and aggregates made by the budget
resolution." [Ref. 32: p. 67] Even if spending legislation
pays for itself with new taxes, a potential point of order
exists against the amount of outlays that exceed a committee's
allocation. In the Senate, the offset has to be reported
before the benefit increase can be reported. This "reserve
fund" allows the Senate, in effect
...to get credit against a committee's allocation of
spending for the deficit reduction accomplished by a tax
increase or a spending cut in another committee's
jurisdiction. Similarly, the reserve fund allows the
Senate to get credit against the revenue floor for the
deficit reduction accomplished by a spending cut (whether
in the same committee's jurisdiction or not). [Ref. 32:
p. 68]
3. Multiyear Budgeting and Enforcement
The BEA makes temporary changes to the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to create five-year
budget resolutions. The budget resolutions are enforced by a
point of order against exceeding committee allocations for the
first year and for the total of the five years covered by the
budget resolution. Under the provisions of the BEA, section
311(A), Congress is not to consider any budget resolution or
related legislation for FY 1992-1995 or any appropriations for
1992-1993 that would exceed the caps or sub-allocations made
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under the caps. The point of order would not apply if the low
growth provision applies or if war has been declared. v
4. Sequestration Procedures
GRH is extended by the BEA through FY 1995. New
deficit targets are provided; however, they are essentially
irrelevant until 1994. They may be adjusted prior to the
start of FY 1992 and 1993 to prevent sequesters due only to
changes in economic and technical assumptions. Because
deficit targets and the economic assumptions behind it are
locked in when the President submits his budget, the only way
Congress can exceed the deficit target is to over-spend. That
would be corrected by a "mini-sequester". As long as Congress
keeps discretionary spending under the caps and follows the
pay-as-you-go requirements, there will be no overall spending
cut to meet a maximum deficit target. [Ref. 36: p. 336] For
FY 1994 and 1995 fixed deficit targets under the GRH system
will apply, enforced by a sequester like that required under
9In the Congressional Research Service Issue Brief on
Budget Enforcement in 1991, Robert Keith discusses the low-
growth provision. A low-growth report to Congress is issued
by CBO if either of the following conditions exist: (1) CBO or
OMB estimate two consecutive quarters of negative real
economic growth during the six-quarter period consisting of
the previous quarter, the current quarter and the four
following quarters, or (2) the Commerce Department advance
preliminary or final reports of actual real economic growth
for the most recently completed quarter and the preceding
quarter indicate economic growth of less than 1% for each
quarter. Upon receipt of such a report, the Senate majority
leader must introduce (and the House majority leader may
introduce) a joint resolution providing for the suspension of
the budget enforcement procedures. [Ref. 35: p. 12]
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the 1985 law. The President may elect to fully adjust the
1994 and 1995 targets for later economic and technical re-
estimates. If he does not choose to adjust the targets, a
1985 "general" seguester will be triggered.
As already detailed, the BEA provides a schedule under
which seguesters can occur several times during the year for
discretionary appropriations and once a year for entitlements
and tax cuts. [Ref. 33: p. 2796] The focus of this is not
only the deficit target. In addition to enforcing
discretionary spending limits and pay-as-you-go reguirements,
a seguester is triggered within 15 days after the end of a
session of Congress if, by OMB ' s estimate, legislation
pertaining to that fiscal year and the prior fiscal year
results in a net increase in the deficit. [Ref. 37: p. 5]
Exceeding budget authority and outlay ceilings in the
categories of discretionary spending will trigger a seguester
to bring spending in that category to below the ceiling.
This is a significant departure from the automatic
spending cuts under GRH law, which has no provision for
adjustments to deficit targets due to changes in the economy
or a mistake in technical forecasts, such as the estimated
rate of tax revenue growth. [Ref. 38] Compliance with the
discretionary spending limits and with the pay-as-you-go
reguirements during the first three years of the agreement
will mean that there will be no seguestration to achieve the
maximum deficit amounts in those years. [Ref. 39: p. 3] The
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timetable for sequestration reports and orders is shown in
Table II.
Budget Timetable
Jan. 30 * CBO sequestration preview report
Feb. 4 * President's budget is due; at the same
time OMB must provide sequestration
preview report.
Aug. 10 * President must notify Congress if he
intends to exempt military personnel from
sequestration or sequester such accounts
at a lower percentage rate.
Aug. 20 * OMB sequestration update report.
10 days after
end ot session
* CBO final sequestration report.
15 days after
end or session
* OMB final sequestration report;
presidential order.
30 days later *GAO compliance report
TABLE II
5. Locked-in Estimating Assumptions
Under the provisions of the BEA, the same economic and
technical assumptions used in estimating the President's
budget submission to the Congress will be used to make
sequestration projections later in the year. This resolves
the problem of Congress "aiming at moving targets" as the
President revises his estimating assumptions during the year.
The Senate Budget Committee will continue to use CBO estimates
and analysis to prepare its reports to the Senate on the
status of particular bills and amendments. The committee will
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also adjust CBO estimates used to determine budget authority,
outlays, new spending authority, and revenues consistent with
adjustments underlying the budget resolution.
6. Additional Process Changes
The BEA reaffirms the off-budget status of Social
Security trust funds and excludes these funds from federal
revenue and spending totals. Although the surplus of funds
was included in deficit calculations made under GRH for
deficit reduction purposes, they were exempt from
sequestration. The BEA takes the trust funds out of the
deficit calculations and continues their exemption from
sequestration. The law requires the budget resolution to set
forth on-budget totals. This represents a significant triumph
to those who complained that the surplus was masking the true
size of the budget deficit.
The BEA increased the authority of OMB. Previously
there was shared power and various estimates of the costs of
legislation, but the President ordered sequestration. Under
the provisions of BEA, OMB authority increased because its
cost calculations are the official ones and are binding on
Congress.
The BEA also makes these changes:
• The BEA codifies the Byrd Rule to prevent including
extraneous matter in reconciliation bills.
• The President's Budget is to be submitted by the first
Monday in February each year.
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• If Congress does not adopt a budget resolution by 15
April, the Chairman of the House Budget Committee must
make an allocation to the House Appropriations Committee
based on the President's budget.
• The Anti-deficiency Act is amended to explicitly prohibit
spending or obligating seguestered direct spending and
restrict the meaning of "emergencies including the safety
of human life or the protection of private property".
C. SUMMARY
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 significantly revised
the budget process. It revised the GRH law which forced the
President and the Congress to confront each other annually to
reach an agreement as to how to meet a set of fixed deficit
targets. The BEA "has revised GRH so that it now enforces the
deficit reduction path on which the President and Congress
have already agreed. [Ref. 32: p. 61] Because the decisions on
how much deficit reduction is to be accomplished, and the
larger choices among defense, domestic, and international
categories have been made, the opportunity exists for the
budget resolution to serve a vital planning function in the
new system. The stability created by this agreement, and the
removal of the threat of general seguestration will allow the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees to do their work in
the absence of budget turbulence caused by economic and
technical factors beyond their control or unforeseen at the
beginning of the budget process.
The purpose of this chapter was to identify the specific
budget process reforms enacted in the Budget Enforcement Act
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of 1990. In summary, the BEA changes the focus of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings from deficit control to spending control, and
provides the enforcement mechanisms to do so.
In the next chapter the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
will be compared with the proposals for reform. It will
provide an analysis of which faction was most successful in
getting its proposals enacted.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
During the period 1980-1989 there was widespread sentiment
that the budget process required reform. Numerous hearings
had been conducted in Congress, but the absence of a policy
consensus reflected the difficulties created by the system of
divided powers and partisan politics. President Reagan and
President Bush each proposed a comprehensive set of reforms
that would increase the budgetary power of the Executive
Branch. Budgetary theorists explored the budget process and
proposed a range of theoretical solutions that would restore
stability and minimize fiscal gimmickry in federal budget-
making. However, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 enacted
few of the actual proposals. It represents a significant
departure from recent practice in federal budgeting, but to
call it a budget reform package misrepresents the scope of the
agreement.
The BEA is not a comprehensive budget reform package. It
does not provide a line-item veto or enhanced rescission
authority for the President. It does not consolidate
committees or rearrange responsibilities within the
Congressional committee structure. Neither does it change the
timetable for budget formulation to the two-year schedule so
many advocated. The BEA is an agreement on spending totals
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over a five-year period and includes the provisions to enforce
those totals. In the process of complying with the provisions
contained in the BEA, significant changes in Federal budget
formulation will occur, but it is clearly not a bill to reform
the process.
The negotiations on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990 were conducted in secrecy. The changes were "drafted
in private by a handful of individuals and approved after the
barest minimur. of public debate." [Ref. 33: p. 2~34; The
budget process changes represent a key aspect: cf the much
broader deficit reduction agreement between the President and
the Congress.
The agreement was the culmination of a protracted debate
over budget totals and process changes, and represents the
compromise struck by the conferees. No one faction was
successful in implementing its previously articulated reform
package. The Executive Branch, over all, gained more control.
The BEA shifted budgetary power from Congress and the CBO
to the President and OMB. The adopted changes implement the
priorities of the President and those who sought to introduce
discipline and procedural honesty to the budget-making
process. The changes restore the President to a strong
leadership role in the budgeting process, giving him the tools
to influence budget formulation and content.
The White House and the Republican negotiators insisted
that OMB be given the power to tabulate the costs of new
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spending programs and tax cuts and to then decide whether to
trigger across-the-board spending cuts reguired to offset a
net increase in the deficit. In exchange for the confidence
that spending restraint would follow, they agreed to support
the higher taxes that were part of the budget deal. [Ref. 40]
Both President Reagan and President Bush sought enhanced
rescission authority and the line-item veto as a budget-
cutting tool and as a means to eliminate special interest
spending. Although the BEA does not grant the President these
tools, the use of 0MB totals on spending bills gives the
Executive branch an almost egually potent means to influence
legislation as it moves through Congress. It enhances the
President's ability to block any legislation which he or she
opposes if it costs more than the caps allow, or if it is an
entitlement or revenue change without an offset. "In the
current legislative environment, where the deficit is shaping
most new legislation, cost estimates are decisive in
determining whether a bill gets passed." [Ref. 40] If the
President feels it is too expensive, this provision forces
Congress to take a stand and defend spending increases. In the
era of budget deficits, Members of Congress do not want to be
viewed as supporting expensive new programs. [Ref. 33: p.
2795]
The spending limits and pay-as-you-go reguirement for
entitlements and revenues may help force the Federal
Government to live within available resources. Although not
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as controversial as an amendment to the Constitution mandating
a balanced Federal Budget, these enforcement mechanisms will
provide budgetary discipline in the absence of consensus and
the ability of Congress to muster the political will to make
the cuts and savings that may be necessary. This seems
particularly true for those benefits and entitlement programs
covered under the pay-as-you-go provisions.
The BEA, in essence, provides the same degree of
cooperation between the branches that Presidents Reagan and
Bush and the theorists hoped to achieve through a Joint Budget
Resolution. By involving the President and representatives of
Congress in the debate over the budget totals, both branches
were forced to resolve policy differences prior to formulation
of appropriations measures. The caps set out spending
priorities within receipts available and will not allow
consideration of legislation which exceeds revenue proposals
without super-majority, (60 vote) approval in the Senate. The
expansion of the sequester to allow review of all
appropriations closes the loophole in GRH to which President
Bush objected.
The idea of setting five-year spending caps for defense,
domestic, and foreign aid programs was discussed by
Republicans as part of the debate over the FY 1991 budget.
Democrats advocated a five-year budget package, but argued
against setting long-term spending caps that would severely
limit Congress's flexibility to respond to changing needs.
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[Ref. 22: p. 2384] The White House and the Republicans
prevailed; the BEA contains spending caps and broke out
discretionary spending into three distinct categories:
defense, domestic, and international programs, for the first
three years of the agreement.
Even though the BEA amends, rather than replaces GRH,
those who proposed overhauling GRH because of the problems
associated with meeting fixed deficit targets under the threat
of general sequestration were successful. This reform
proposed by so many in Congress and among budget experts is
reflected in the elimination of fixed deficit target as the
focus of the budget debate. The BEA
...changes the emphasis in the Congressional budget
process from controlling the growth of the deficit to
limiting spending. .
.
[and it] appears to minimize the
possibility of general sequestration for the next two
fiscal years." [Ref. 9: p. 26]
The enforcement mechanism is the requirement that all
legislation pay for itself or trigger a "mini-sequester".
There is no doubt that there will be continued demand for
budget process reform. The strengthened role of the Executive
Branch represents a shift in budgetary power that is
unacceptable to many in Congress. A major consideration
influencing the position of Senators and Congressmen with
regard to the budget agreement is the impact of the decisions
on interests in the individual legislators' district or state.
Many members felt they voted on a budget package without fully
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understanding its contents and its implications for budget
formulation for the next five years.
To simply create limits on federal spending and provide a
set of mechanisms to enforce those caps will not reconcile the
diverse and competing interests in government. Layers of
complexity exist, and each attempt to reform the process adds
yet another layer. Until there is sufficient public pressure,
in other words, until it becomes a constituent issue to make
the budget process efficient, it is doubtful that Congress
will make significant improvements in the way the federal
budget is formulated.
This study was limited by the current nature of the
subject. A suggested topic for further research is to
evaluate the BEA and its effect of budget formulation over the
period of the agreement. The study would analyze the budget
process as it evolves over the five years of the agreement and
what additional reforms are determined to be necessary.
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